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RECENT DECISIONS

that, subject to constitutional restrictions, the statute as enacted will
be applied. The statute itself supplies two relevant criteria to be used.
First, the dispute, in order to be a labor dispute, must be one which
relates to conditions of employment or representation of persons in
negotiating conditions of employment. 16 Second, the disputants must
be commercially participating in the same industry. 17
The plaintiff contended that the statute limiting an injunction to
a period of six months was unconstitutional. The statute does not
deprive plaintiffs of property without due process of law, but prevents
the use of a stale injunction. It seeks to provide a method whereby
the injunction may be re-examined at reasonable intervals.18 Injunctions are protection for the future, not punishment for the past.' 9 Injunctions should issue to restrain only unlawful and violent methods
of the defendant, and should not include the peaceful and legal methods
sanctioned by law. The statute itself enumerates eleven categories
of
20
activities such as peaceful picketing which may not be restrained.
B.F.

PATENT ACT-SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST Ac.--Defendant corpo-

ration appeals from a decree of the District Court of the United States
for the Southern District of New York restraining it from granting
licenses to jobbers and oil refiners who sell and distribute such fuel on
the ground that such conduct violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.'
The corporation manufactures tetraethyl lead, a patented, poisonous,
fluid compound which, when made a part of gasoline used in highpressure engines, increases their efficiency. This substance is sold to
oil refiners solely for use in the production of this improved type of
motor fuel. Licenses are issued gratis to jobbers and refiners of
16 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a (10-c) ("The term 'labor dispute' includes
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, *** terms or
conditions of employment, * * *).
1 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 876-a (10-b) ("A person *** shall be held to
be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought

against him * * * and if he * * * is engaged in the industry, * * * in which such

dispute occurs, or is a member, * * * or agent of any association of *** employees engaged in such industry, * * * ").
's N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 876-a (8) ("No permanent injunction shall
remain in force for more than six months, from the date on which the judgment
is signed, provided, however, that the duration of the injunction may be
extended for another six months, if after a further hearing initiated and conducted in the same manner as the original hearing the court shall determine that
the injunction shall be continued or modified in accordance with the findings of
facts on the subsequent hearing").
'9 Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931).
2o N. Y. Cxv. PRAc. Act § 876-a (1-F).
' 50 STAT. 693, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1937).
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gasoline under patents controlled by the corporation, for the purpose
of bestowing the privilege upon these fuel dealers of producing gasoline with tetraethyl lead. The corporation's only source of profit is in
the sale of the patented compound. However, the licenses which it
issues are conditional upon the compliance by the licensees with rules
and regulations promulgated by the licensor, and as a result the latter
controls the methods and practices used in the production of this
improved type of gasoline as well as its resale price. One hundred
and twenty-three refiners who refine eighty per cent of all gasoline
sold in the United States are involved, and competition in the industry
is restrained. The company seeks to justify its actions on the theory
that the public health requires protection from its poisonous product.
Held, the conditional licenses are not within the scope of the defendant's patents and the legislative provisions under which they were
issued, and the judgment of the lower court to the effect that they
violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is affirmed. Ethyl Gasoline
Corporationv. United States, 309 U. S.436, 60 Sup. Ct. 618 (1940).
The United States Constitution gives to Congress the right to
create patents and copyrights. 2 Pursuant to this provision Congress
has granted to every patentee, for the term of seventeen years, "the
exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery." 3
The Sherman Act 4 states:
"Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
*** is hereby declared to be illegal * * *
"Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize or attempt
to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons to monopolize any part of * * * trade or commerce
*** shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ***"
Only "undue" restraint of commerce is prohibited. 5 A combination
or contract may be unlawful under the Sherman Act though it relates
to either patented or copyrighted commodities. 6 The right of the patentee to contract with respect to the patent is conferred by the general
law rather than the patent. 7 There is a point beyond which the patent
laws have no force. Thus it is stated with respect to a license agreement in Straus v. American Publishers' Association: 8
"The agreements clearly, therefore, transcended what was
necessary to protect the use of the patent or the monopoly
Art. I, § 8.
201 (1870), 35 U. S. C. A. § 40 (1934).

2 U. S. CoNsT.

3 16 STAT.
4 See note
5 Standard
6 Standard

(1912).

1, mipra.

Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911).
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9

Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 13. S.224, 12 Sup.
8 231 U. S.222, 34 Sup. Ct. 84 (1913).
7

Ct. 632 (1892).
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which the law conferred upon it. They passed to the purpose
and accomplished a restraint of trade condemned by the Sherman law. * * * "

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act does not restrict the monopoly created
by the patent laws. 9 Since the term "restraint" in the Sherman Act
has been construed to mean "undue restraint", only such acts as are
against public policy are within the scope of this law.10 Therefore, as
the patent law is an act of the legislature, it is definitely not against
public policy; and, when an agreement is within the scope of the patent
law, it is not subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act."
Patent monopolies have their inherent limitations beyond which
there is no protection from the anti-trust laws.12 License agreements
seeldng to control an industry under a patent, which obviously does
not cover the entire industry, are illegal. 3 Patents authorize monopolies over the subjects of their grants, but confer no right upon the
owners of several distinct patents to combine for the purpose of retarding competition and trade.' 4 Agreements requiring licensed manufacturers to maintain fixed prices are valid unless the licensees produce
a substantial majority of the output in the restricted line.'5 A survey
of the cases on this branch of the patent law reveals that the courts
have applied the doctrine of "reasonable protection" 16 in determining
legality. It also evidences the necessity for careful and vigorous
investigation and research by skilled legal technicians to determine
whether the decisions are only in dpparent conflict and whether the
present flexible state of the law is more advantageous than the certainty that a well-planned codification would bring.
M. S.
9 Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Co., 154 Fed. 358 (C. C. A.
7th, 1907).
10 See note 5, supra.
11 See notes 8, 9, supra.
12

See note 8, supra.

13 National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 Fed. 36 (C. C. A. 3d, 1897).

14 See note 12, supra.
Is Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 22 Sup. Ct 747 (1902)
(In the other Harrow cases, 83 Fed. 36 (C. C. A. 3d, 1897), 84 Fed. 226 (C. C.
N. Y. 1898) a different result was reached because the scheme maintained a
monopolistic control over a substantial part of the output. The "Bathtub"
Trust, 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1912), controlling 78% of the output of
enameled-ware and 80%o of the jobbers in that line, was held illegal. The license
agreement in that case also fixed prices as in the instant decision) ; United States
v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 191 Fed. 172 (D. C. Md. 1911), aff'd, 226 U. S.
20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1912); Lord v. Radio Corp. of America, 24 F. (2d) 565
(D. C. Del. 1928) (Radio Corporation, controlling 70% of the supply of vacuum
tubes, licensed manufacturers to make receivers under its patents, the licensees
agreeing to purchase all tubes used in such sets from the licensor; the contract
was held to be in violation of the Sherman Act).
26 The doctrine that a patentor to keep within the protection of the patent
act must only impose such restrictions on the use of his patent as will reasonably
protect his rights in such patent.

